Retrieval of lower completion results in WCI

What happened?

Following the inability to run the lower completion (surface addressable system (SAS) c/w 2 swellable packers + 1 mechanical zonal isolation packer) to the targeted setting depth, it was decided to pull the completion.

After the packer (full hole) entered the casing, tripping volume anomalies were noticed, interpreted as swabbing effect - estimated volume swabbed: 8 cubic metres (282.5 cubic feet). No possibility to circulate below the packers.

Decision is taken to continue to pull - pumping out - compensating swab by replacing volume of mud below packer.

As packers assembly reached top of hole (casing hanger) – Blowout preventer (BOP) was shut in and each packer was stripped-up to mitigate any possible trapped pressure / effluent underneath. When the last packer passed above the 9-5/8" (24.45cm) casing hanger, a pressure build up was noticed and stabilised at 270 psi.

Situation was assessed and packer could be stripped out to rig floor and laid out.

A crossover (XO) was installed to drill pipe (DP) string in order to strip double float valves assembly back into the well in order to circulate the influx out using Driller's method.

Why did it happen?

Swab kick, hole not filled properly.

Pumped back the extra volume recovered not understanding that the volume below the packer was not filled with 1.52SG (specific gravity) mud but light effluent.

2 swellable packers inflated increasing drags and risk of swabbing.

Lack of clear procedure to pull out of hole (POOH) completion - scenario not considered (management of change).

What did they learn?

Add contingency procedure in completion program for POOH the completion.

Reinforce chain of command protocol in case of anomaly (ex swabbing).

Ask yourself or your crew

What failures in your operations would lead to implementation of contingency procedures?

Are your potential failures identified and mitigated, and are contingency procedures in place?

How do we know the risk controls/barriers are working?

What improvements or changes should we make to the procedures, controls/barriers, or the way we work?

What happened?

Following the inability to run the lower completion (surface addressable system (SAS) c/w 2 swellable packers + 1 mechanical zonal isolation packer) to the targeted setting depth, it was decided to pull the completion.
After the packer (full hole) entered the casing, tripping volume anomalies were noticed, interpreted as swabbing effect - estimated volume swabbed: 8 cubic metres (282.5 cubic feet). No possibility to circulate below the packers.
Decision is taken to continue to pull - pumping out - compensating swab by replacing volume of mud below packer.
As packers assembly reached top of hole (casing hanger) – Blowout preventer (BOP) was shut in and each packer was stripped-up to mitigate any possible trapped pressure / effluent underneath. When the last packer passed above the 9-5/8" (24.45cm) casing hanger, a pressure build up was noticed and stabilised at 270 psi.
Situation was assessed and packer could be stripped out to rig floor and laid out.
A crossover (XO) was installed to drill pipe (DP) string in order to strip double float valves assembly back into the well in order to circulate the influx out using Driller's method.
Why did it happen?

Swab kick, hole not filled properly.
Pumped back the extra volume recovered not understanding that the volume below the packer was not filled with 1.52SG (specific gravity) mud but light effluent.
2 swellable packers inflated increasing drags and risk of swabbing.
Lack of clear procedure to pull out of hole (POOH) completion - scenario not considered (management of change).
What did they learn?

Add contingency procedure in completion program for POOH the completion.
Reinforce chain of command protocol in case of anomaly (ex swabbing).
Ask yourself or your crew

What failures in your operations would lead to implementation of contingency procedures?
Are your potential failures identified and mitigated, and are contingency procedures in place?
How do we know the risk controls/barriers are working?
What improvements or changes should we make to the procedures, controls/barriers, or the way we work?