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A raffinate splitter was inadvertently overfilled with liquid during set-up. As the splitter warmed up, the pressure rose and liquid puked into the over-head line. The pressure safety valves (PSVs) were located in the overhead line approximately 45m below the top of the tower. The overfill created enough static head to cause the PSVs to lift, discharging a large quantity of light hydrocarbons to the unit blowdown drum which was connected to an atmospheric vent stack. Most of the liquid released flowed to a closed sewer but some puked like a geyser from the top of the stack. The resulting vapour cloud found an ignition source and exploded. 15 people in or near temporary turnaround office trailers located close to the blowdown stack were killed and a further 180 were injured. A shelter-in-place order was issued requiring 43,000 people to remain indoors.
Ask yourself and your crew:
- How can something like this happen here (e.g. on our site)?
- What safety measures (i.e. procedures, controls/barriers) do we have in place to mitigate the risk?
- How do we know the risk controls/barriers are working?
- What improvements or changes should we make to the procedures, controls/barriers or the way we work?
Original content courtesy of IChemE Safety Centre
