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A fluid catalytic cracker (FCC) unit experienced a trip in the regenerator flue gas expander, triggering the automatic safety system to put the FCC unit in standby mode. This halted the feed and initiated steam injection, closed vital catalyst slide valves, and stopped the main air blower. Despite the FCC main fractionator pump circuits remaining operational, hydrocarbon vapor backflow to the regenerator was prevented through steam injection. The FCC unit was in standby mode as the expander was being cleaned. An explosion later occurred in the FCC electrostatic precipitator (ESP), causing significant damage and near misses to neighbouring equipment containing hazardous hydrofluoric acid. Fortunately, no fatalities occurred, but four contractors sustained minor injuries while evacuating the explosion site and were treated with first aid.
Ask yourself and your crew:
- How can something like this happen here (e.g. on our site)?
- What safety measures (i.e. procedures, controls/barriers) do we have in place to mitigate the risk?
- How do we know the risk controls/barriers are working?
- What improvements or changes should we make to the procedures, controls/barriers or the way we work?
Original content courtesy of IChemE Safety Centre
